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The Privacy Implications of Personal Locators: Why 
You Should Think Twice Before Voluntarily Availing 
Yourself to GPS Monitoring  
Waseem Karim∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Department of Defense designed the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) in the early 1970s to track the position of 
military troops and equipment.1 GPS consists of a network of 
satellites that transmit radio signals to Earth, where a radio receiver 
then triangulates its own position based upon the readings from the 
satellites.2 Following an airline mishap in the 1980s, GPS became 
available for civilian use and safety purposes due to its superior 
navigation capability.3 
Since that time, civilian uses for GPS have expanded beyond 
aviation.4 Because the receivers are relatively inexpensive,5 GPS is 
used in a variety of capacities, such as car navigation, mineral and 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2004, Washington University School of Law. 
 1. ALESSANDRA A.L. ANDRADE, THE GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM: 
NAVIGATING INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM 37 (2001). GPS made its “wartime debut” during the 
Persian Gulf War. SCOTT PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 1 (1996). GPS 
technology helped to guide missiles to hit precise targets. Brandon Eric Ehrhart, Note, A 
Technological Dream Turned Legal Nightmare: Potential Liability of the United States Under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act for Operating the Global Positioning System, 33 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 371, 378 (2000). For example, one may recall the image of a Standoff Land 
Attack Missile (SLAM), directed by GPS, blasting a hole in an Iraqi power plant, followed by a 
second SLAM that flew through the same hole. Id. 
 2. Aaron Renenger, Note, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
549, 550 (2002). Currently, the GPS consists of twenty-nine satellites. ANDRADE, supra note 1, 
at 24. 
 3. ANDRADE, supra note 1, at 38. Korean Airlines Flight 007 strayed off its course and 
was shot down when it flew into Soviet Airspace, prompting President Reagan to open GPS for 
civilian use free of charge. Id. at 38, 53 n.6.  
 4. Id. at 38.  
 5. See Ehrhart, supra note 1, at 375.  
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resource exploration, recreational activities such as camping, and 
weather forecasting.6 Recently, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) has required cellular phone providers to equip 
their phones with location-detecting capabilities.7 
This Note will discuss the most novel use to date of GPS 
technology: the personal tracking device, or personal locator. Several 
companies have developed personal locators, which can pinpoint the 
exact location of the individual wearing the device. These personal 
locators are designed and intended for the average citizen to purchase 
and wear voluntarily. One might ask why the average citizen would 
want to wear a device that can pinpoint their location. Among the 
benefits of personal locators, as cited by their proprietors, is an ability 
to quickly identify the location of a person in an emergency medical 
situation.8 However, the main reason that these devices have 
suddenly gained popularity is their ability to track the location of 
children.9 As a result of a sudden increase in the media’s coverage of 
child abduction cases, parents have experienced elevated fears of 
their own children’s abduction.10 For many parents, investing in a 
personal locator for their child is a reasonable precaution against 
abduction.11  
Part II of this Note examines two personal locators that are 
currently on the market: Wherify Wireless’s Personal Locator and 
Digital Angel. The section also examines the VeriChip, a microchip 
containing the personal information of the wearer, which is implanted 
under their skin.12 Part II discusses the relationship between the 
heightened media coverage of child abductions during the summer of 
200213 and the popularity of personal tracking devices.14  
 
 6. ANDRADE, supra note 1, at 38.  
 7. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.  
 8. For more information, see Digital Angel’s website, at http://www.digitalangel.net/ 
consumer.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
 9. See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, A High-Tech Eye on the Kid, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Aug. 19, 2002, at A1. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. For more information, see VeriChip’s website, at http://www.adsx.com/prodservpart/ 
verichip.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
 13. See, e.g., Evangelista, supra note 9. 
 14. See, e.g., Hanna Kale Kinnersley, Cranky Consumer: Tracking Kids By GPS, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 24, 2002, at D2 (“After this summer's high-profile child-abductions, parents are 
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Next, Part II discusses the privacy concerns raised by the use of 
these devices. Because the data generated from these devices could 
be valuable for a variety of purposes, including marketing research, 
this Note considers the level of privacy that a user of a personal 
tracking device can expect from unwanted access to their data. 
Furthermore, Part II considers the foreseeable use of these devices for 
government surveillance purposes. Although tracking devices have 
enormous potential for use in law enforcement, both in real-time 
tracking and in access to past location information, the potential for 
abuse is also extremely great. Part II discusses the manner in which 
courts have balanced the use of more primitive forms of tracking 
devices with the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable search.15 Part II also examines the government’s ability 
to access data under the recently passed USA PATRIOT Act.16 
Part III of this Note begins by speculating whether the sudden 
media coverage of child abductions in 2002 was intended to help to 
create a market for personal locators, particularly in light of both the 
corporate ownership of the media and the story selection process. 
Part III also discusses the inadequacy of both the current tort law and 
statutory privacy measures, as well as the problem of the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” standard courts use in Fourth Amendment 
analysis. While some of the analysis may seem premature because of 
personal tracking devices’ relatively recent development and 
currently limited market, personal use of location-detecting 
technology will undoubtedly expand as new benefits emerge and as 
the public becomes more accustomed to the notion. Thus, it is critical 
to be prepared for the legal problems that may arise. Furthermore, 
personal locators constitute merely one component in a larger 
progression towards surveillance and data monitoring.17 With 
increased capabilities comes increased power, especially with regard 
 
more concerned than ever about their children's safety.”). 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 16. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  
 17. See Jay Stanley & Barry Steinhardt, Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The Growth of 
an American Surveillance Society (2003), at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm 
?ID=11573&c=39&Type=s#FileAttach (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) (discussing increased 
methods of data surveillance and the ability to link these technologies, resulting in a 
“surveillance monster”). 
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to the government, and privacy law must be retooled in order to 
adequately protect against surveillance capabilities.18  
Finally, Part IV of this Note proposes that the strongest protection 
of privacy from unwanted surveillance lies in the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure.19 
As the courts’ current framework of analysis is inadequate in keeping 
up with the novel privacy concerns raised by new technology, a new 
focus of analysis should examine whether there is a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” for the information once it is gathered. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE PERSONAL TRACKING DEVICE AND 
PRIVACY LAW AS IT STANDS 
A. Personal Tracking Devices 
This section will briefly examine the different personal tracking 
devices that have recently arrived on the market.  
1. Wherify  
Wherify Wireless, Inc.,20 claims to have produced the first 
personal tracking device, called the Personal Locator.21 Individuals 
can wear this device like a wristwatch, and Wherify is marketing it to 
parents for use in tracking their children.22  
The Personal Locator uses both GPS technology and the Sprint 
PCS Network to pinpoint the location of the wearer. Parents can use 
 
 18. Id. at 14-17. 
 19. Originally limited to the protection of physical searches of personal property, the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection was broadened to include electronic surveillance in the case of 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil 
Liberties: The USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 943-47 (2002).  
 20. Timothy Neher founded the company in 1998. For more information, see Wherify’s 
website, at http://www.wherifywireless.com/about_hist.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
 21. See Wherify’s website, at http://www.wherifywireless.com/prod_watches.htm (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
 22. See Doug Bedell, Keeping a High Tech Watch on the Children, THE RECORD, Sept. 
15, 2002 (stating that Wherify is targeting the product towards children aged five to ten). The 
watch’s cartoonish appearance also clearly indicates that Wherify is marketing its product to 
children. For a picture of the watches, see Wherify’s website, at http://www.wherifywireless. 
com/prod_watches.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).  
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the Internet to conduct a “locate” search to display an aerial map of 
the child’s exact location.23 Users can also employ a “Locate History” 
function that allows them to view thirty days worth of location data.24 
Parents can track the child’s location at ten-minute intervals by using 
the “Bread Crumb” feature.25 Because the Personal Locator employs 
the Sprint PCS system, a child can use the Personal Locator device to 
call 911,26 and the device will automatically dial 911 if someone tries 
to cut it off or if the child wanders beyond the perimeter of a preset 
area.27 Wherify has shipped 1,000 units since releasing its product in 
July 2001, and it has received close to 100,000 orders through its 
website.28 Soon, retailers will begin to carry the Personal Locator.29 
2. Digital Angel 
Applied Digital Solutions (ADS), through its subsidiary Digital 
Angel Corp., has produced a wristwatch-style GPS device known as 
Digital Angel.30 Using AT&T Wireless Services,31 the device triggers 
a “WanderAlert” in the event that the wearer moves beyond the 
 
 23. See Wherify’s website, at http://www.wherifywireless.com/prod_locserv.htm# (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2003), for a demonstration of the Wherify Internet system. At this website, one 
can perform a simulated “Locate,” which gives an aerial photograph of Manhattan with the 
number “1” indicating the location of the simulated child. Id. The “Locate” function also gives 
a timestamp indicating when the child was at the location, the address of the child’s location, 
and the longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates indicating the location. Id.  
 24. See id., which also simulates the “location history” function. In this demonstration, 
there are four positional numbers with timestamps, addresses, and coordinates, indicating where 
the simulated child has traveled between 9:56 and 10:11 on the morning of January 23. Id.  
 25. See Bedell, supra note 22. 
 26. The Personal Locator uses the Sprint PCS system to monitor the child’s 911 distress 
call. Id. 
 27. Elizabeth V. Mooney, Wireless Moves Beyond Devices to Clothes, Skin Chips, RCR 
WIRELESS NEWS, Sept. 2, 2002, at 13. 
 28. Evangelista, supra note 9. 
 29. See Doug Olenick, Wherify Ships GPS Locator This Month, TWICE, Sept. 2, 2002, 
available at http://www.twice.com/index.asp?layout=story&articleId=CA241868&pubdate 
=09/02/2002 (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) (stating that Wherify President Timothy Neher, though 
unable to say which retailers would “participate in the [products’] rollout,” said that “it would 
be in the major consumer electronic chains”).  
 30. See Mooney, supra note 27. 
 31. Id. The AT&T Network is used to relay the information from the GPS locator to 
Digital Angel’s Operation Center. For an illustrated demonstration of the system, see Digital 
Angel’s website, at http://www.digitalangel.net/works_demo.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
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perimeter of a preset area.32 Digital Angel does not boast the high 
number of orders that Wherify does; it has sold 200 units and has 
received orders for 1,000 more.33 
3. VeriChip 
Perhaps the most intriguing new device is the VeriChip.34 The 
VeriChip is a miniaturized radio frequency identification device 
(RFID)—the size of a grain of rice—which stores a person’s unique 
verification number, from which one can access his personal 
information, including medical information. What makes the 
VeriChip so unique is that it is surgically imbedded underneath a 
person’s skin. A special scanner, when passed over the VeriChip, can 
read the chip’s information.35 Thus, a hospital equipped with a 
special scanner could obtain a patient’s medical history by reading 
his VeriChip.36 As of this writing, nine people have received 
 
 32. See Vincent J. Schodolski, Parents Look to Technology to Track Kids, CHICAGO 
TRIB., Sept. 9, 2002, at 1. For an illustrated demonstration on how the WanderAlert functions, 
see Digital Angel’s website, at http://www.digitalangel. net/works_demo (last visited Nov. 2, 
2003). The GPS monitor sends a message through AT&T’s wireless service to a cellular tower 
when the wearer wanders beyond a preset boundary. Id. The monitor then relays the message to 
Digital Angel’s operation center, which gives an alert to the designated caregiver. Id. 
 In addition to using GPS, the Digital Angel monitors the wearer’s vital signs and changes 
in the environment. See id. The “ThermAlert” triggers an alert when there is a drastic change in 
the wearer’s environmental surroundings. Id. “Such a shift could suggest that those prone to 
wandering have inadvertently encountered a potential harmful situation.” Id. The Digital Angel 
can also send an alert when the wearer has fallen down. Id. 
 Monitoring vital signs and sending an alert if the wearer has fallen down indicates that one 
of the main purposes of the Digital Angel is to monitor senior citizens, particularly those 
afflicted with Alzheimer’s Disease. Based on the information from the company’s website, it 
appears as though Digital Angel is not marketing their products primary towards children, as 
Wherify is. Digital Angel representatives advertise that their product is designed for active 
senior citizens, impaired senior citizens, families on the go, and pets. Id. 
 33. See Mooney, supra note 27. 
 34. Applied Digital Solutions, who also manufactures Digital Angel, produces the 
VeriChip. 
 35. VeriChip’s website states: “Utilizing an external scanner, radio frequency energy 
passes through the skin energizing the dormant VeriChip, which then emits a radio frequency 
signal containing the verification number. The number is displayed by the scanner and 
transmitted to a secure data storage site by authorized personnel via telephone or Internet.” For 
more information, see the product’s website, at http://www.adsx.com/prodservpart/ 
verichip.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
 36. The Global VeriChip Subscriber registry service (GVS) provides access to the 
database containing the information of the individual with the implant. Id. Using a scanner, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol14/iss1/16
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VeriChip implants,37 including the members of the Jacob family, who 
received a great deal of publicity when they were implanted with 
VeriChip live on NBC’s Today Show.38 In addition to medical uses, 
the company is promoting the device’s use for security purposes,39 
such as controlling access to secure areas and functioning as a 
personal verification system to prevent identity theft.40 While the 
VeriChip does not currently have GPS technology, in May 2003, 
ADS successfully tested a working prototype of an implantable GPS 
device.41  
Currently, there are twelve centers authorized to implant 
VeriChips in eight different states.42 ADS also has agreements to 
distribute VeriChip in Mexico, Russia, Columbia, and Venezuela.43 
Like a soft-drink company sending promotional buses to ballgames 
 
healthcare providers could access the GVS to retrieve medical information such as preexisting 
medical conditions and emergency contact numbers. Id.  
 37. Lini S. Kadaba, Taking a High-Tech Approach to Child Security, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER, Aug. 15, 2002. 
 38. Glenn Singer, ID Chip Debuts; Stock Plummets; Applied Digital Media Blitz Fails to 
Allay Concerns, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, May 11, 2002, at 12B. The scanners will sell for 
$1,000-$1,500. Beatrice E. Garcia, First Chip Implant Procedures Go Without Hitch, MIAMI 
HERALD, May 11, 2002. 
 39. See VeriChip’s website, supra note 35.  
 40. Id. The company explains that both government facilities and privately owned 
buildings can use the device. Id. VeriChip’s use as a personal verification system is an 
“enormous, untapped potential,” according to the company, citing its ability to secure access to 
banking and credit card accounts. Id. 
 The British government’s Home Office is debating yet another use for an implantable GPS 
tracking device. Dominic Tonner, Pedophiles May Be Fitted with Electronic Tags, SUNDAY 
TIMES – LONDON, Nov. 17, 2002, at 5. The government is considering a plan to implant 
convicted pedophiles with GPS tracking devices. Id. 
 41. Laureen Fagan, Is the Price Right? Some Believe Bids for National Security Come at 
the Cost of Americans’ Civil Liberties, S. BEND TRIB., May 18, 2003. In England, Kevin 
Warwick, a professor at Reading University, is developing a GPS microchip of his own that can 
be implanted into a person. Sally Weale, Parents—Would You Microchip Your Child?, 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 4, 2002, at P8; see also Margarett Driscoll, This Girl’s Parents Want to Keep 
Track of Her by Microchip: Paranoia or Wise Precaution?, SUNDAY TIMES – LONDON, Sept. 8, 
2002, at 24. Eleven-year-old Danielle Duval is ready to receive the first microchip implant. 
Driscoll, supra, at 24.  
 42. On October 22, 2002, the Food and Drug Administration announced that the VeriChip 
is not a regulated medical device for safety, financial, and personal identification/safety 
applications, but rather is a regulated medical device when marketed “to provide information to 
assist in the diagnosis or treatment of injury or illness.” FDA Rules on Applied Digital’s Chip, 
S. FLA. SUN-SENTINAL, Oct. 23, 2002, at 1D. 
 43. BUSINESS WIRE, July 23, 2003.  
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and college campuses, the company has a “ChipMobile” that travels 
to popular areas to promote the VeriChip.44 
B. The Media’s Influence on Public Perception 
The proliferation of personal tracking devices depends upon the 
public’s willingness to purchase and voluntarily use these devices. As 
discussed above, parents’ desires to protect children from potential 
kidnappers have contributed to the demand for the locators45 and has 
been a selling point for their proprietors.46  
Beginning in the summer of 2002, the media focused heavily on 
coverage of child abduction cases.47 This coverage, in turn, prompted 
reports on the fact that media coverage itself had increased.48 
Statistically, however, the number of child abductions has decreased 
over the past several years.49 Despite this actual decrease in child 
abductions, however, the media coverage has heightened fears of 
abduction, precipitating interest in personal locators.50 
1. Media Ownership 
Because of the sudden, and seemingly unprovoked, media 
attention towards child kidnappings, we must ask: why the sudden 
media interest? An answer to this question may be discovered in the 
structure of media ownership, and the decision-making process 
involved in reporting.  
 
 44. See Verichip’s website, supra note 35. 
 45. See, e.g., Evangelista, supra note 9. 
 46. See, e.g., Bedell, supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing Wherify’s efforts 
to market their product for children).  
 47. See, e.g., Kadaba, supra note 37; see also Evangelista, supra note 9. The media in 
England also began emphasizing child abductions. See, e.g., Driscoll, supra note 41 (“Having 
your child surgically implanted with a microchip may be extreme, but the killings of Holly 
Wells, Jessica Chapman and Sarah Payne . . . have stirred parental fears to unprecedented 
levels.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Stephanie Dunnewind, Parent Panic; It’s Just Human Nature, Say 
Psychologists, That Makes Parents fear Child Abductions out of Proportion with Reality, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at E1. 
 49. See, e.g., Evangelista, supra note 9. 
 50. Evangelista writes, “With stories about missing and abducted children . . . seemingly 
making headlines every week, Wherify and makers of similar tracking devices . . . are receiving 
an increasing number of calls from consumers and the media.” Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol14/iss1/16
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Recently, mergers and acquisitions have increasingly consolidated 
American media.51 Critics argue that this concentration of media 
ownership in a handful of corporations can have a stifling effect on 
the free exchange of information,52 which results from the corporate 
ownership’s manipulation of the content.53 The potential influence of 
media ownership on the marketplace for personal tracking devices is 
analyzed later in this Note.54 
Another influence on story selection is the tendency to report on 
information that is already circulating.55 Due to deadlines and other 
constraints, it is difficult for reporters to seek novel stories about 
which to report.56 As a result, there is a “media frenzy,” where 
various news organizations give one particular issue substantial 
attention, all relying upon the same source of information.57  
 
 51. See generally Donald R. Simon, Comment, Big Media: Its Effect on the Marketplace 
of Ideas and How to Slow the Urge to Merge, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 247 
(2002). Some of the most prominent media mergers include Disney and Capital Cities/ABC, 
Viacom and CBS, and America Online and Time-Warner. Id. at 248. Most recently, on June 2, 
2003, the FCC approved a measure to relax media ownership restrictions by a 3-2 vote. See, 
e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen & Joe Flint, FCC Eases Media-Ownership Caps, Clearing the Way for 
New Mergers, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2002, at A1. The two dissenters, Commissioners Adelstein 
and Copps, were sharply critical of the decision and warned that a small number of companies 
would have too much influence over the media. Id. 
 52. As ownership concentrates, access to the media also narrows to exclude those with 
viewpoints that do not fit within the permissible range of discussion. Anne Benaroya, Note, 
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps Revisited: A Critical Approach to Different Standards of 
Protection for Media and Nonmedia Defendants in Private Plaintiff Defamation Cases, 58 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1268, 1288 (1990). See also Paul Wellstone, Growing Media 
Consolidation Must Be Examined to Preserve Our Democracy, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 551, 552 
(2000) (“[O]ne corporate conglomerate can still exercise control over the content of media that 
reaches citizens through many different outlets. The safest and best way to ensure diversity of 
viewpoint is through diverse ownership.”).  
 53. Wellstone, supra note 52, passim. The Columbia Journalism Review and the Pew 
Center for the People and the Press conducted a survey that revealed that 61% of journalists feel 
that parent corporations have influence on story selection. Id.  
 54. See infra notes 138-___ and accompanying text. 
 55. CARLA BROOKS JOHNSTON, SCREENED OUT: HOW THE MEDIA CONTROL US AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 123 (2000). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the Research, 9 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 47-48 (1997). 
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2. Fear and the Media 
Commentators charge that the media encourages the public to 
remain in a state of panic and apprehension about every danger that 
may exist.58 They argue that society has become increasingly 
preoccupied with risks, threats, and safety.59 Whether the media is the 
chief cause of society’s state of anxiety60 or simply amplifies a 
preexisting sense of risk and fear,61 the media stays true to the saying 
“if it bleeds, it leads,” by using violence and fear to increase its 
ratings.62 Viewers will feel the need to consume more news in order 
to stay up-to-date on the latest harms.63 When individuals feel 
vulnerable, they are willing and open to accept an offered solution to 
alleviate that fear.64  
While the number of children kidnapped has not increased,65 
people have in recent years repeatedly heard about and seen the latest 
child abduction. Parents will naturally fear these stories that appear 
far more real than statistics, which are too abstract to grasp.66 
Through continuous repetition, the problem becomes a priority in the 
 
 58. See generally FRANK FUREDI, CULTURE OF FEAR (Continuum 2d ed. 2002) (1997).  
 59. Id.  
 60. JOHNSTON, supra note 55, at 8. Johnston points to the “Y2K” scare over the 
millennium computer bug, and writes that the public would not have been stirred into a frenzy 
had they not heard about it from the media. Id.  
 61. FUREDI, supra note 58, at 52-53. Furedi explains that, while the media plays a 
significant role in shaping the public’s perception of risks, it is not the cause of society’s sense 
of risk. Id. at 53. 
 62. Symposium, Crime, Recidivism, Public Perception and the Media, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
297, 306 (1999). 
 63. JOHNSTON, supra note 55, at 79. 
 64. See id. at 86. Anthony Pratkanis and Elliott Aronson state:  
A fear appeal is most effective when:  
• It scares the hell out of people. 
• It offers a specific recommendation for overcoming the fear-arousing threat. 
• The recommended action is perceived as effective for reducing the threat.  
Id.  
 65. See Evangelista, supra note 9 
 66. Dunnewind, supra note 48. Kidnapping is the greatest fear for parents of children, 
from toddlers to teenagers. Id. 
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public mind, creating a sense of urgency about the threat of child 
abductions.67  
C. Privacy Implications and the Protection of Personal Information 
Considering the speed at which personal tracking devices are 
developing and the devices’ perceived popularity,68 they will soon 
proliferate. Furthermore, it is only a matter of time until the market 
sees a GPS device that will be surgically imbedded into a person, as 
ADS continues to make breakthroughs in technology.69 As such, it is 
important to address the privacy concerns that the use of these 
devices raises. Moreover, these privacy concerns are not exclusive to 
personal tracking devices, as one can apply them to various new 
kinds of technology.70 Personal locators have the ability to generate 
virtually limitless amounts of data about an individual.71 For 
example, locations where the individual travels, shops, and eats are 
just a few of the many pieces of information that the proprietors of 
the devices can collect and relay to a wide variety of interested third 
parties.72 Intimate details about an individual’s life become available, 
and when these data are compiled, they create a comprehensive 
profile of a person.73 Indeed, there are profiling companies devoted to 
aggregating data and selling profiles on individuals.74 Obviously, this 
 
 67. BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 16 (5th ed. 1997). Bagdikian explains, 
“It is in that power [of repetition]—to treat some subjects briefly and obscurely but others 
repetitively and in depth, or to take initiatives unrelated to external events—where ownership 
interests most effectively influence the news.” Id.  
 68. See, e.g., Evangelista, supra note 9. 
 69. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 70. For a description of other kinds of technologies that implicate privacy, see infra note 
155.  
 71. See Renenger, supra note 2 (exploring the possible ways in which marketers could use 
data collected from cell phones equipped with GPS technology).  
 72. Marketers, however, are not the only third parties that could be interested in this data. 
James Dempsey of the Center for Democracy and Technology explains, “[W]hat if your insurer 
finds out you’re into rock climbing or late-night carousing in the red-light district? What if your 
employer knows you’re being treated for AIDS at a local clinic? The potential is there for 
inferences to be drawn about you based on knowledge of your whereabouts.” Id. at 563 
(quoting Simon Romero, Location Devices’ Use Rises, Prompting Privacy Concerns, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, at 1). 
 73. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 11-12. 
 74. Data is collected on a wide range of information, drawing on everything from book 
preference to lactose intolerance. See the Electronic Privacy Information Center’s Privacy and 
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information is extremely valuable.75 Therefore, it is important to 
consider what rights people who voluntarily wear personal locators 
have to protect their personal information from third parties. 
1. Privacy rights in tort law 
The Second Restatement of Torts recognizes four privacy torts.76 
For the purposes of tracking devices, Section 652A(1)(A) and 
(1)(B)—the torts for unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of 
another and for dissemination of an individual’s private 
information—are applicable.77  
If an individual wearing a personal locator whose information was 
sold to a third party were to seek a claim due to publicity dispersed 
regarding his private life, he must show that the matter publicized 
was of a kind that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person,” and that the information was “not of legitimate concern to 
 
Consumer Profiling webpage, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/ (last visited Nov. 2, 
2003) for a list of the kinds of data gathered. Profiles are indexed in a variety of different ways. 
Id. The American List Counsel, for example, sells an “ultra affluent database.” Id. 
 75. In fact, consumer information that is not collected is considered to be “money left on 
the table.” Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 4. 
 76. The Second Restatement of Torts states:  
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the 
resulting harm to the interests of the other. 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by 
 (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another . . . or 
 (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness . . . or 
 (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life . . . or 
 (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public . . . .  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).  
 77. The “false light” privacy tort is inapplicable because the commercial use of personal 
information does not concern whether the information is false, but rather whether it can be 
made public. Renenger, supra note 2, at 556. The misappropriation tort, which applies to the 
misuse of an individual’s name or image, is also inapplicable because the individual’s name or 
image is not likely to be the matter of concern. Id. See also Richard C. Balough, Global 
Positioning System and the Internet: A Combination with Privacy Risks, 15 CBA REC. 28, 29-
32 (2001). 
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the public.”78 However, under this tort, a person cannot recover 
damages when he is in the public eye, as the intrusion does not 
pertain to his private life.79 
For liability to exist under the intentional intrusion of privacy tort, 
there must be an “intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion 
of another,” and the intrusion must be of a kind that is “highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.”80 Because the tort involves an 
individual’s solitude, liability generally does not exist when the 
individual is in the public eye.81 However, solitude is not dependant 
upon whether the location is private, but rather upon the expectation 
of privacy and the kind of invasion that takes place.82  
 
 78. Renenger, supra note 2, at 556-57 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D 
(1977)). The Restatement provides several illustrations to define what would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable man:  
 9. When A’s daughter is married, A holds in his home a private wedding, to which 
only members of the family and a few intimate friends are invited. B Newspaper 
obtains information from those present and publishes an accurate account and 
description of the wedding. This is not an invasion of the privacy of A. 
  . . . .  
 11. A is about to give birth to a child, and is told that a caesarian operation will be 
necessary. She agrees to allow B to make a motion picture of the operation for 
exhibition to medical students for educational purposes. B exhibits the picture to the 
public in a commercial theater. This is an invasion of A’s privacy. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c, illus. 9, 11 (1977). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. § 652B. Whether the information is publicized is irrelevant for this tort, as liability 
depends solely upon whether the individual’s solitude was intruded upon. Id. § 652B cmt. a. 
 81. Id. § 652B cmt. c. 
 82. Id. The Restatement explains, “[T]here is no liability for the examination of a public 
record concerning the plaintiff.” Id. However, the Restatement also states that there can be 
liability, even in public areas, when there exists an expectation of privacy. See id. See also 
Evans v. Detlefsen, 857 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the location of the intrusion 
is relevant in helping to determine the sufficiency of evidence of seclusion, but is not outcome 
determinative, as seclusion is defined by the type of interest involved). Some courts have 
interpreted the case law to mean the plaintiff must show an actual, subjective expectation of 
seclusion and that this expectation was objectively reasonable. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. 
Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002). Others have found 
that an intrusion occurs when the actor is substantially certain that he lacks permission to 
commit an intrusive act. See Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 
876 (8th Cir. 2000).  
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2. FCC regulation of GPS in cellular phones 
The privacy concerns regarding the commercial use of customer 
data that will foreseeably arise with the use of personal tracking 
devices can be evaluated by a comparison to a similar debate 
involving customer data collected by telecommunications carriers, 
especially in light of the availability of location-detecting technology 
in cellular phones.83 
Because telecommunications carriers have the capacity to collect 
vast amounts of data from an individual using their service, Congress 
took measures to protect information collected from consumers, 
involving Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI).84 
When it passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress 
included section 222, which requires telecommunications companies 
to obtain customer approval before distributing CPNI to third 
parties.85  
A controversy arose because the Act did not clarify the manner in 
which the companies could obtain customer approval.86 The FCC 
created a regulation87 adopting an “opt in” approach that requires a 
telecommunications carrier to obtain express customer consent to 
market CPNI to third parties.88 Telecommunications carrier U.S. 
 
 83. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 84. Ellen Traupman, Who Knows Where You Are? Privacy and Wireless Services, 10 
COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 133, 134 (2001). CPNI includes “virtually all information about a 
customer’s use of network services that a [carrier] may acquire in providing those services.” Id. 
at 137 (quoting PETER H. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 1257 n.235 
(1999)). 
 85. Id. at 139 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (1996)). The Act, in relevant part, reads: 
[A] telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary network 
information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service shall only use, 
disclose, or permit access to individually identifiable customer proprietary network 
information in its provision of (A) the telecommunications service from which such 
information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the provision of such 
telecommunications service, including the publishing of directories. 
47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2003). 
 86. See Traupman, supra note 84, at 139. 
 87. 13 FCC Rec. 8061 (1998). 
 88. See Traupman, supra note 84, at 139. See also Brian A. Kelley, Note, U.S. West, Inc. 
v. FCC: Exposing the Deficiencies in Government Attempts to Protect Customer Privacy, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1055, 1056 n.8 (quoting the FCC regulation that codifies the CPNI order). “A 
telecommunications carrier must obtain customer approval to use, disclose, or permit access to 
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West challenged the FCC’s interpretation of section 222 in U.S. West, 
Inc. v. FCC.89 In this case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that the “opt-in” approach constituted an undue restriction on 
commercial speech protected by the First Amendment.90 In July 
2002, the FCC issued the Final CPNI Order,91 which is current to 
date, allowing telecommunications carriers to use an “opt-out” 
approach when sharing CPNI with affiliate companies, but still 
requiring an “opt-in” procedure when sharing information with third 
parties.92  
Under the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 
1999 (WCPSA), Congress authorized the FCC to administer the 
deployment of enhanced wireless 911 (E-911) services.93 The FCC 
established a regulation94 that requires cellular phone companies to 
include location-detecting technology in their cellular phones in order 
to track the originating location of 911 calls.95  
 
CPNI to market to a customer service to which the customer does not already subscribe to from 
that carrier.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(b)(1)-(2). 
 89. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 90. Id. at 1240. The court found that a restriction on the audience of speech is a restriction 
on the speech itself. Id. at 1232. Addressing the issue of customer privacy, the court explained 
that the government failed to show that releasing CPNI would cause specific and significant 
harm to customers. Id. at 1235. The court found that a general level of discomfort in knowing 
that personal information is circulating does not rise to the level of a substantial state interest, 
explaining that “we live in an open society where information may usually pass freely.” Id. 
 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Briscoe wrote that the CPNI Order does not directly impact 
the carrier’s expressive activity. Id. at 1243. Rather, it narrowly impacts the telecommunication 
companies’ non-expressive speech by requiring them to obtain, rather than imply, consent. Id. 
at 1243-44. As such, this limited impact does not warrant First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 
1244. The dissent explained that it was not the job of the FCC to provide a justification for the 
privacy interest. Id. at 1245. Rather, the FCC was merely carrying out the privacy interest that 
Congress already articulated in section 222. Id.  
 91. 17 FCC Rec. 14,860 (2002). 
 92. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Consumer Privacy in the E-Commerce Marketplace, INTERNET 
L. & BUS., Aug. 2002, at n.99 and accompanying text, available at http://www.epic.org/epic/ 
staff/hoofnagle/ilbpaper.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
 93. Pub. L. No. 106-81, 113 Stat. 1286 (1999) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 615 
(2003)).  
 94. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2002).  
 95. See Traupman, supra note 84, at 134. The regulation states, “Licensees . . . must 
provide to the designated Public Safety Answering Point Phase II enhanced 911 service, i.e., the 
location of all 911 calls by longitude and latitude . . . .” 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(e) (2002).  
 Telecommunications providers were generally required to implement this regulation by 
October 1, 2002. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(d) (2002). However, the FCC has extended the deadlines 
because telecommunications providers were falling behind schedule. John Dorschner, Location 
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As a result of the location-detecting capability of cellular phones, 
Congress amended the definition of CPNI to include location 
information.96 The WCPSA requires a customer’s “express prior 
authorization” before location information may be disclosed.97 This 
language also caused controversy because the Act does not explain 
the procedure for gaining customer authorization.98 Despite this 
ambiguity, it is clear that authorization cannot be implied, and it 
appears as though a customer must “opt-in” before a 
telecommunications carrier may disclose location information.99 
The recent debate over the manner in which to regulate 
telecommunication carriers’ use of CPNI and location information is 
useful in predicting and evaluating some of the issues that will arise 
from personal tracking devices. While a personal locator is subject to 
FCC regulation,100 it is likely that these devices do not fall under the 
current regulations applicable to telecommunications carriers.101  
 
Still Hard to Pinpoint by Cellphone, MIAMI HERALD, June 2, 2002. The deadline for full 
deployment is December, 2005. Id. 
 Telecommunications companies have the option to use either network-based technology to 
provide location information, or to incorporate GPS technology into cell phones. Renenger, 
supra note 2, at 551-52. Sprint PCS, Alltel, and Nextel are using GPS technology. Id. at 552. 
 Telecommunications carriers are developing E-911 to combine with advanced mapping 
systems that can not only plot the location of a call, but also detail crime statistics, report traffic 
jams, and report other events occurring in the area. David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy: 
Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communcation, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 5 
(2003). 
 96. See 113 Stat. 1286.  
 97. 47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (2002). 
 98. See Traupman, supra note 84, at 144. 
 99. Id. The FCC denied a request from the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet 
Association (CITA) to clarify their position regarding the distribution of location information, 
as they expressed that Congress’s intent was sufficiently clear. See id. Privacy advocates 
nevertheless worry that, without specific FCC guidelines addressing location information, the 
telecommunications carriers have too much flexibility to adopt their own approaches. Id. 
Telecommunications carriers are also upset with the FCC’s refusal to clarify their position 
because it leaves them in a position of uncertainty. E-mail from Chris Hoofnagle, Associate 
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center, to Waseem Karim (Feb. 12, 2003, 14:56 CST) 
(on file with the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy).  
 100. The ability to regulate these devices falls under the FCC’s umbrella. See 47 U.S.C. § 
151 (2001) (creating the FCC’s power to regulate communication by radio). See also 47 U.S.C. 
§ 153(43) (2001) (defining “telecommunications” to mean “the transmission, between or among 
points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing without change in the form or 
content of the information sent and received”); 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (2001) (defining 
“telecommunications carrier” to mean “any provider of telecommunications services”). 
 101. In an e-mail to the author, a representative from the FCC, while speaking only from 
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D. Government Data Collection and Surveillance 
Up to this point, this Note has considered privacy concerns 
relating to the consumer data generated by personal tracking devices. 
However, another potential privacy problem involves the 
government’s possible use of the devices for surveillance and data 
collection. Given the enormous potential that these devices can have 
for law enforcement, it is certainly conceivable that law enforcement 
officials will attempt to use them. Recently, for example, police 
departments have used GPS systems in automobiles to track 
carjacking suspects.102 As history has shown, the government has 
tried to use surveillance—legally or illegally—when opportunities to 
do so are available, and a greater opportunity than the personal 
locator for the surveillance of people is scarcely imaginable.103 As 
such, we must consider the degree to which people who use GPS 
tracking devices are making themselves vulnerable to surveillance 
and profiling.  
Where corporations have the potential to collect data about 
individuals for their use, the government has the capability to 
consolidate the information and to create all-inclusive profiles on 
individuals.104 While the Privacy Act of 1974105 prohibits the 
 
personal opinion, explained that personal locator companies must register their equipment with 
the FCC in the same manner that the manufacturers remote control garage door opener must. E-
mail from FCC Consumer Center, to Waseem Karim (Oct. 23, 2002, 09:09 CST) (on file with 
the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy). Therefore, registration alone does not 
make a personal locator proprietor a telecommunications carrier. Furthermore, it was the 
representative’s opinion that personal locator companies are not considered to be 
telecommunications carriers. Id. 
 102. In July 2003, cars stolen in various U.S. cities were tracked via GPS systems. See, 
e.g., Mike Musgrove, Guardian Angels of the Highway, WASH. POST, July 20, 2003 at F07. 
 103. See Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for 
Covert Government Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1076-77 (2001) (discussing 
congressional discoveries revealing the FBI’s practice of illegally wiretapping political figures 
and dissidents in the late 1960s and early 1970s).  
 Illustrating an example of police abuse, the ACLU cites an instance from 1997 in which a 
top ranking Washington, D.C. official used the police database to blackmail married individuals 
who frequented gay clubs. ACLU, What’s Wrong with Public Video Surveillance? (undated) 
(on file with the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy). Should law enforcement 
have the capacity to gain location information about an individual twenty-four hours-a-day, the 
potential for abuse would also be enormous. 
 104. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 7-8.  
 105. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1996). 
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government from maintaining profiles on individuals who are not the 
targets of investigation,106 the Act does not prohibit the government 
from purchasing information from private organizations.107 In fact, 
reports indicate that the Justice Department has an eight million 
dollar contract with Choicepoint, a data collection company, for 
access to their database of personal information.108  
1. The history of tracking device and technological surveillance 
The GPS-equipped personal locator is a recent technology. 
However, the tracking device itself is not a new concept, and law 
enforcement has been using various forms of location-detecting 
devices for years.109 Consequently, there is judicial precedent 
regarding the use of tracking devices.  
In United States v. Knotts,110 law enforcement officials placed a 
“beeper” (radio transmitter) on a chloroform container that the 
defendant had purchased.111 The police followed the defendant’s 
automobile to his cabin, which was a drug laboratory, and, naturally, 
they arrested him.112 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the conviction on the grounds that the use of the beeper was an 
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.113 
Relying on Katz v. United States,114 the Supreme Court reversed the 
Eight Circuit, holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation 
 
 106. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 8. 
 107. Id. See also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and 
Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 583 n.170 (1995) (stating 
that the Act does not affect the ability of agencies to obtain personal information from private 
organizations).  
 108. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 8. EPIC obtained documents under the 
Freedom of Information Act revealing the extent to which United States government agencies 
have contracts with ChoicePoint to obtain information about both U.S. and foreign citizens. The 
documents are available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/publicrecords/inschoicepoint.pdf, and 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/publicrecords/citizenprices.pdf. 
 109. See generally Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth 
Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 277 
(1985). 
 110. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 111. Id. at 278. 
 112. Id. at 278-79. 
 113. Id. at 279.  
 114. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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because the defendant could not reasonably expect privacy when he 
was traveling in an automobile on public roads.115  
The Washington State Court of Appeals considered the use of the 
more sophisticated GPS locator in State v. Jackson.116 This case 
involved a missing child, the father of whom was the prime 
suspect.117 The police obtained a warrant118 to place GPS tracking 
devices on the father’s automobiles.119 Via the GPS monitor, 
investigators were able to track the father to a location where the 
child’s missing body was found.120 The appellant argued that the trial 
court erred in upholding the search warrants.121 The State contended 
that search warrants were unnecessary because there was no 
requirement to show probable cause to place the GPS tracking 
device.122 The Jackson court relied on the Washington State 
Constitution, using the “private affairs” inquiry, a broader test than 
the Fourth Amendment’s “subjective and reasonable expectation of 
 
 115. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. The Court relies on two questions raised in Katz, asking 
whether the defendant exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and whether the subjective 
expectation of privacy was one that society would recognize as reasonable. Id. at 281-82. 
 Furthermore, the Court found that the use of devices that heighten an individual’s sensory 
perception, such as binoculars for seeing, are not prohibited, so long as the subject is available 
in some manner to the public. Id. at 282. 
 As an interesting aside, the defendant argued that should the government prevail, then 
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without judicial 
knowledge or supervision.” Id. at 283 (quoting the defendant’s brief). The Court responded, 
“[I]f such dragnet-type law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be 
time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.” 
Id. at 284.  
 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), also involved a situation in which law 
enforcement officials placed a beeper on a container of chemicals to track the defendant’s 
movement. Id. at 708-10. The Court held that it was not a search for law enforcement officials 
to place the beeper on the container unbeknownst to the defendant. Id. at 713. However, the 
Court afforded Fourth Amendment protection when the beeper was no longer in a public 
location and moved to a private location. Id. at 714. See also Fishman, supra note 109, at 280. 
 116. 46 P.3d 257 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 117. Id. at 260-61. 
 118. In Knotts, the police did not have a warrant to place the beeper on the can of 
chloroform. In addition to examining the validity of the search warrants, the court in Jackson 
also examined the same issue that arose in Knotts: whether a probable cause obligation 
necessitating a warrant even exists under the circumstances. Id. at 268. 
 119. Id. at 261.  
 120. Id. at 261-62. 
 121. Id. at 268. 
 122. Id.  
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privacy” standard articulated in Katz.123 Nevertheless, the court 
determined that when something is available to the public eye, the 
court will not consider it to be a person’s private affair.124  
In Kyllo v. United States,125 the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether the use of a thermal imaging detector constituted 
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.126 Here, the 
police scanned Kyllo’s home with a thermal imaging device127 to 
detect the levels of heat emanating from different areas of the home; 
the police then matched the heat’s consistency with that of high-
intensity lamps used for marijuana growth.128 The Court found the 
use of the device to be an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment,129 and determined that a minimal and reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists in the home.130 Considering the use of 
sense-enhancing technology, the Court held that a search occurs 
when technology obtains information “that could not otherwise have 
been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area,’” and the technology used “is not in general public 
use.”131  
 
 123. Id. at 269. The court relied on Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, 
which states, “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 
the authority of law.” Id. at 268 (quoting WA CONST. art. I, § 7). 
 124. Id.  
 125. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 126. Id. at 29. 
 127. Id. Developed by the United States Army, thermal imagers can detect the infrared 
radiation from an object and produce a visual image. Amy Miller, Note, Kyllo v. United States: 
New Law Enforcement Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 181, 185 
(2002). 
 128. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30. 
 129. Id. at 40-41.  
 130. Id. at 34. 
 131. Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court articulated that it did not want to “leave the 
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.” Id. at 35. 
 Arguing that the use of thermal detectors was not a search, the dissenting opinion explained 
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy from heat waves that emanate from a 
building. Id. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent criticized the criterion 
that the use of a technology can amount to a search if it “is not in general public use,” charging 
that the requirement is “somewhat perverse” because “the threat to privacy will grow, rather 
than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.” Id. at 47 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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2. Surveillance legislation 
Practically speaking, law enforcement officials could obtain the 
data from personal tracking devices with relative ease. This point is 
especially clear when one considers the fact that the Department of 
Defense operates the GPS.132 As such, the question is whether law 
enforcement can access the data legally.  
Legislation pertaining to electronic surveillance has been modified 
repeatedly over the years,133 the most recent development of which 
has been the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, 
or the USA PATRIOT Act.134 Generally, this legislation broadens 
federal law enforcement’s authority to use surveillance and 
eliminates barriers in retrieving intelligence information.135 In 
particular, by lowering the standard of proof and reducing judicial 
oversight, the Act broadens the FBI’s ability to obtain the 
information that a business maintains about an individual when the 
FBI is conducting an intelligence investigation.136 Furthermore, the 
Act broadens the government’s ability to conduct searches in 
secret.137  
 
 132. ANDRADE, supra note 1. 
 133. In 1968, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
(OCCSSA) in response to the dramatic increase in government surveillance during the 1960s. 
Evans, supra note 19, at 951-53. OCCSSA required a government attorney to grant 
authorization to law enforcement officials in order for them to intercept electronic 
communications, and for officials to gain authorization from the Attorney General in order to 
intercept wire or oral communications. Id. at 953. Tracking devices, however, are explicitly 
excluded from the definition of “electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2000).  
 134. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Both houses of Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act in fewer than six weeks following the attacks of September 11, 2001. H. Peter 
Del Bianco, Jr., Is Big Brother Watching Out For Us?: The Case for Civil Liberties, 17 ME. 
B.J. 20, 21 (2002). The Act passed with overwhelming support and almost no debate, as 
Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) was the only voice of opposition in the Senate. Id. at 21, 28 n.2. 
 135. Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Development, USA PATRIOT ACT, 39 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 435 (2002). 
 136. Del Bianco, supra note 134, at 25. The Act did not reduce the right to carry personal 
firearms, however, because the Attorney General argued that there was no current legal 
authority to make such a restriction. Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1119 (2002). The Attorney General failed, however, to make a similar 
argument regarding the right to obtain business information. Id. 
 137. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 9-10 (explaining that under the Act, U.S. 
intelligence could conduct a search of a citizen’s home in secret, use evidence found to declare 
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II. ANALYSIS  
A. Media Manipulation? 
The fact that the media’s increased reporting on child abductions 
has helped to create a market for personal tracking devices is 
undeniable,138 but whether there was any intention to do so is left to 
speculation. Nevertheless, it is worth exploring why the possibility 
for intentional news manipulation may exist. 
Because Americans get their information about current events 
from the media, news sources have become an authority on what is 
significant or trivial, true or false.139 The corporate owners act as 
“gatekeepers” to information,140 and critics believe that the 
mainstream media has the power to form public opinion by deciding 
what events to report and what meaning to ascribe to the events.141 
Because the corporate owners are so large and have ties that expand 
through political, social, and economic spheres; and as the lines 
between these spheres become increasingly blurred, the potential for 
news manipulation and subservience to these interests is enormous.142 
 
the citizen an “enemy combatant,” and imprison him without a trial).  
 138. See supra notes 58-67. 
 139. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 67, at xiiv.  
 140. EDWARD S. HERMAN, BEYOND HYPOCRISY: DECODING THE NEWS IN AN AGE OF 
PROPAGANDA 12 (1992). 
 141. NOAM CHOMSKY, NECESSARY ILLUSIONS 9 (1989). Chomsky describes in detail what 
he terms the “propaganda model,” where discussion and debate are not outright restricted, but 
are instead fit within a framework that is suitable to state interest. Id. at 8.  
 142. See Jim Parker, The CBS-Viacom Merger: Impact on Journalism, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 
519, 522-25 (2000). One commentator poses the question: 
Is it a good idea for Time-Warner Chairman Gerald Levin to control the WB Network, 
HBO, TNT, TBS, CNN, CNNfn, CNNsi, Cinemax, Warner Bros., New Line Cinema, 
Hanna-Barbera, Castle Rock, Time, People, Sports Illustrated, Fortune, 28 other 
magazines, Warner Books, Little Brown, Warner Bros. Records, Atlantic, Elektra, 
Sire, Rhino, Time Warner Cable, and much more?  
Simon, supra note 51, at 264 n.176. For a listing of holdings of the major media companies, see 
The Columbia Journalism review, at http://www.cjr.org/owners (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
 Arguing for heightened scrutiny by antitrust agencies and the FCC, late Senator Paul 
Wellstone asked: “As these far-flung multinational corporations extend their holdings and 
influence into more and more other industries, how much confidence can we have that they will 
hold any of those interests accountable to the people?” Wellstone, supra note 52, at 552. In 
news media, friends of the media, including major advertisers, are known as “sacred cows” 
because they are resistant to criticism. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 67, at 47. In one example, NBC 
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In short, as Noam Chomsky explains, major media (i.e., the elite 
media that establishes an agenda for the others to follow) are 
corporations engaged in “selling” an audience.143 
For the many parents who felt vulnerable to kidnappings in recent 
years, seemingly the personal locator has emerged as a seemingly 
beneficial safety device.144 The makers of these devices have seized 
the opportunity to use the media hype of abductions as a selling point 
for the locators.145 Obviously, the many news items about personal 
locators do not discuss the relationship between the recent media 
attention towards child abductions and the timely release of the 
various personal locators, beyond it being a coincidence.146 
Ultimately, the question of whether there is any connection 
between the media’s reporting on child abductions and the release of 
the tracking devices is one of speculation. Even still, the close 
connection between mass media and corporate and state interests may 
have fueled the sudden media hype of child abductions. As such, one 
possible explanation is that the proprietors of these devices 
influenced major media to create a market for their products when 
they debuted in the marketplace. Given the capability of implants and 
tracking devices to implement surveillance in the most intrusive 
manner, others might be inclined to argue that the “conspiracy” 
extends a step further as part of a nationwide plan to implement “Big 
 
asked Coca-Cola to review a documentary on Coca-Cola’s use of migrant farmworkers before it 
aired. JOHNSTON, supra note 55, at 139. NBC removed segments of the documentary per Coca-
Cola’s request. Id.  
 143. CHOMSKY, supra note 141, at 8.  
 144. The numbers of news items that link the Summer 2002 child abduction case with 
parents’ interest in personal locators are almost countless. See, e.g., Kinnersley, supra note 14. 
 145. Apparently using guilt as a persuasive technique, an ADS spokesperson says, “[w]e 
have GPS units for our cars. If your car is stolen, we can locate it. Do we love our cars more 
than our children?” Kadaba, supra note 37 (quoting ADS Spokesman Matthew Cossollotto).  
 146. See, e.g., Elliot Spagat, Global Positioning Systems Are Now in Kids’ Watches, Golf 
Toys, Even Fish Trackers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at D2 (“With growing concerns about 
child safety following a spate of abductions around the country, Wherify’s timing is good.”).  
 However, several reports do mention that Personal Locators had been in development for 
years before the media coverage and that the makers of these devices do not want to come 
across as capitalizing on kidnappings. Kathryn Balint, GPS Kid: Satellite Locators Track 
Youngsters, but Practicality vs. Paranoia Debated, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 16, 2002, at 
E1. 
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Brother,”147 especially in light of post-September 11th measures to 
increase government surveillance. 
B. The Shortfall of Current Privacy Law 
The current safeguards against unwanted intrusions of privacy 
offer insufficient protection from novel technology like the personal 
locator. For one, the law of torts falls short of providing adequate 
protection of privacy. An individual wearing a device would most 
likely have no cause of action under the publicity tort, so long as the 
information is collected in public areas.148 As such, one can create an 
extensive profile on an individual based on information collected 
from public areas.149 
The intentional intrusion-of-privacy tort also offers little to protect 
privacy. Because the intentional intrusion of privacy tort is 
determined or limited by a reasonable expectation of privacy,150 the 
fact that an individual uses a personal locator voluntarily naturally 
implies that she expects to forgo some of her privacy. This 
assumption, however, is problematic. Simply because she consents to 
use a personal locator does not per se imply that she expects or 
consents for the personal locator service provider to share the 
information with third parties.151 Nevertheless, so long as the 
 
 147. One author, David Icke, envisions a “microchipped population” in which the 
population’s every movement is monitored. DAVID ICKE, . . . AND THE TRUTH SHALL SET YOU 
FREE, 437-38 (1995). Years ago, he wrote: “The only thing that remains [in implementing this 
scheme] is persuading public opinion to accept it, or even demand it. One way this will be done 
is to highlight missing children stories, including abductions of babies from maternity wards.” 
Id. 
 148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).  
 Because personal tracking devices can track individuals regardless of whether they are in 
public or in private (notwithstanding the ability for the user to turn “off” the device, if 
available), if the individual is in a private location, such as his own home, he may have a cause 
of action under this tort if the private information were made public. See id. For example, if the 
individual was having an extra-marital affair, and if someone with access to the GPS data 
shared this information to a third party and then disclosed this matter, which would likely be 
offensive to a reasonable person, it would be grounds for a cause of action under this tort. Id. 
 149. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
 150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 151. See Balough, supra note 77, at 30. In discussing the use of GPS technology in rental 
cars, Balough explains that a renter who turns on GPS may not be giving sufficient consent for 
the rental company to share the data. Id. Balough cites to Ainsworth v. Century Supply 
Company, 693 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), which held that a plaintiff who gave consent to 
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individual is in a public place, it is unlikely that she can maintain an 
argument that there was a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”152 
One optimistic note for the future of protecting data from personal 
tracking devices lies in the FCC’s approach to regulating cellular 
phone location information. If FCC regulations do indeed regard 
location information as a special class of CPNI, which specifically 
requires “opt-in” customer consent, then one can expect a similar 
willingness to protect the dissemination of location information from 
personal tracking devices.153 However, the FCC regulations apply 
only to telecommunications carriers, and it is unclear whether 
personal locators will ultimately fall under the FCC’s domain.154 
C. The “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test Is Ineffective 
Against Government Data Collection and Surveillance  
Personal tracking devices will potentially present a significant 
threat to privacy with regard to government abuse in data collection 
and surveillance. With new technology such as the personal locator 
developing at a more rapid rate than that with which the law can keep 
pace, the potential for abuse intensifies.155 More importantly, the 
bigger threat, as identified by Jay Stanley and Barry Steinhardt of the 
ACLU, is the “Synergies of Surveillance”: the capability of the 
government to unify different technologies and data resulting in 
comprehensive surveillance and collection of data systems.156 The 
 
being videotaped when installing ceramic tile for an instructional video was not consenting to 
the video being aired on television. Id. 
 152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977). 
 153. Because the FCC refused to make a specific ruling on cellular phone location 
information, it is not entirely clear that “opt-in” consent is required. See supra note 99.  
 154. See supra note 101 (describing an e-mail to the author from an FCC representative 
expressing uncertainty over whether the FCC can regulate personal locators). 
 155. The personal locator is just one of many new devices that threatens privacy. Stanley & 
Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 16. Other devices include face recognition technology, the 
proposed national ID card, and the latest technology, “brain fingerprinting,” which can 
supposedly read a persons thought patterns. Id. at 12-13.  
 156. Id. at 11-14. The authors propose the following illustration: 
A tourist walking through an unfamiliar city happens upon a sex shop. She stops to 
gaze at several curious items in the store’s window before moving along. 
Unbeknownst to her, the store has set up the newly available “Customer Identification 
System,” which detects a signal being emitted by a computer chip in her driver’s 
license and records her identity and the date, time, and duration of her brief look inside 
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result of this comprehensive network could have an unprecedented 
chilling effect on society.157  
In light of the United State Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Knotts,158 and the Washington State Court of Appeals’s 
examination of GPS devices in State v. Jackson,159 a court seems 
likely to consider the wearers of personal locators not to have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when they are in the public eye and 
have voluntarily worn the locator.160 Therefore, under the current 
framework for analyzing the Fourth Amendment, it is unlikely that a 
court would grant protection from an unreasonable search should law 
enforcement access an individual’s GPS location information even 
with a search warrant.161 Similarly, because the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Kyllo162 involved an intrusion upon the 
home, the decision offers little in the way of protecting the location 
information of an individual who wears a personal locator from 
unwanted surveillance.163 
Under the current judicial framework, Fourth Amendment 
protection is scarcely available when an individual is in a public 
 
the window. A week later, she gets a solicitation in the mail mentioning her “visit” and 
embarrassing her in front of her family. 
Id. at 1. 
 157. If individuals live with an awareness that they are under surveillance, then they will 
continually evaluate each decision they make, asking questions such as: “Will this make me 
look suspicious?” and “Will this reduce my ability to get insurance?” Id. at 14. 
 158. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 159. 46 P.3d 257 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 160. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Knotts); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 115-24 (discussing the holding in Jackson).  
 161. The Supreme Court, in Katz, noted, “The Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places,” and therefore what an individual seeks to keep private, even if available to the public, 
could be protected. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Nevertheless, an individual 
voluntarily wearing a personal locator in public will find it difficult to argue that he expected 
privacy. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.  
 162. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 163. Once again, it would be difficult to argue that an individual who voluntarily wears 
such a device has an expectation of privacy when in public. 
 Despite the Court’s reliance on the private location of the search in their decision, the 
ACLU considers the Kyllo decision to be an important step in protection of privacy from 
technology. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 17. The ACLU reasons that the Court’s 
examination of the actual capabilities of thermal imaging devices demonstrates a willingness to 
reconsider the Fourth Amendment as applied to new technology. Id. 
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area.164 Yet, new technologies that the framers of the Constitution 
could not have imagined, such as the personal locator, have the 
capability to conduct extensive searches through observation in 
public areas.165 The current analysis amounts to a green light for the 
government to spy on individuals anytime they step outside of their 
homes.166 Such an analysis is problematic in light of location-
detecting technology. The arrival of E-911 in cell phones creates a 
system capable of tracking the always-increasing cell phone-carrying 
population whenever their phones are turned on.167 Likewise, if an 
individual voluntarily wears a personal tracking device, he might also 
be opening himself to surveillance. 
The current Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” standard is inadequate because the standard itself is defined 
by capability and pervasiveness of new technology.168 As Professor 
Anthony Amsterdam observed thirty years ago, “the government 
could diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy 
merely by announcing half-hourly on television . . . that we were all 
forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic 
surveillance.”169 In other words, if the government announced flatly 
that they would conduct such surveillance, then it would no longer be 
subjectively reasonable to expect privacy. Likewise, once society 
accepts and integrates a technology, then it may no longer be 
reasonable to expect privacy from it.170 If personal tracking devices 
 
 164. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 165. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 16.  
 166. See id. at 16-17. 
 167. Hoofnagle, supra note 92, at n.83 and accompanying text. Although cellular telephone 
companies explain that bandwidth limitations only allow location tracking to occur when an 
individual receives or makes a call, Hoofnagle explains that companies foreseeably can increase 
bandwidth capacity, making constant tracking a realistic possibility. Id. 
 168. Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment 
to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, at 1331-35 (2002) (quoting 
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34). See also Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 16-17 (arguing that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy should not be defined by the capabilities of technology). 
 169. S. Bryan Lawrence III, Comment, Curtilage or Open Fields? Oliver v. United States 
Gives Renewed Significance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 795, 807 n.87 (1985) (quoting Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974)). 
 170. Simmons, supra note 168, at 1332. This conclusion is alluded to by the majority 
opinion in Kyllo, explaining that the use of intrusive technology might be a search if it is not “in 
general public use.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. As the dissent explains, the threat to privacy actually 
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become widespread, then courts may not consider it reasonable to 
expect the GPS location information to remain private from 
government monitoring. 
Acts of Congress offer users of personal locators little protection 
from government surveillance. Instead of strengthening privacy laws 
to meet new technology, acts such as the USA PATRIOT Act 
increase the government’s ability to conduct surveillance and obtain 
information.171 For example, the Act reduces the required standard of 
criteria to obtain information maintained by a business.172 If the 
business is a personal-locator proprietor and the information is an 
individual’s travel history or GPS data, the FBI could gain access to 
this data under the low relevance standard.173  
III. PROPOSAL 
The most immediate method for users of personal tracking devices 
to prevent proprietors from distributing consumer information is to 
secure privacy agreements with the companies. It is important for 
consumers to recognize the tremendous capability of these devices to 
intrude upon privacy, and for them to take active steps to protect their 
privacy and to make sure that the companies use the data only for its 
intended security purpose.174 
Legislatures also need to take an active role in addressing the risk 
to privacy that new technologies, like the personal tracking device, 
present. One good start occurred in California, where the legislature 
introduced a bill containing a new invasion-of-privacy tort.175 This 
privacy provision, which was ultimately defeated, required any 
company to obtain an individual’s express permission before 
 
increases if the technology is more widespread. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 171. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 1, 9-10. 
 172. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Del Bianco, supra note 134, at 25. 
 174. If the individual secures a privacy agreement and the proprietor breaches the 
agreement, then this could be a cause of action under the intentional intrusion tort. See supra 
notes 80-82 and accompanying text. The agreement would help to satisfy the difficult 
evidentiary burden of demonstrating a “reasonable expectation of privacy” while in the public 
eye, as the expectation comes from the agreement. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 175. Renenger, supra note 2, at 564 (citing S.129 § 1798.100, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
1999) (as amended Aug. 26, 1999)). 
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releasing his information to third parties.176 Such an “opt-in” 
requirement is critical in protecting privacy.177 If there is a 
presumption that information may be circulated unless otherwise 
expressed by the individual, the reality is that most individuals will 
not even be aware of the extent to which their personal information is 
gathered and distributed to the highest bidder. The United States 
Congress should adopt comprehensive privacy laws that protect all 
types of customer information. 
Even more threatening than the commercial exploitation of this 
technology is the potential for governmental abuse. It is critical for 
Congress to enact comprehensive privacy laws protecting the public 
against surveillance.178 While it is true that Congress must keep up 
with technological advances and evaluate the novel privacy concerns 
that they raise, technology will continue to progress at a rapid pace. A 
reactionary method of addressing privacy problems when they arise 
would be inadequate if each measure only addressed a specific kind 
of technology or information.179 Congress should, therefore, adopt 
privacy laws that cut across different kinds of technology, including 
personal tracking devices.180 
It would be highly unrealistic, however, to expect Congress to 
take such action when there is overwhelming support to weaken 
privacy laws.181 Therefore, it is particularly important for the judicial 
system to address privacy issues within a new analytic frame. The 
best protection against unwanted surveillance is the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches.  
A necessary change in the courts’ Fourth Amendment analysis is 
for the focus of “reasonable expectation of privacy” to move away 
 
 176. Id.  
 177. Polling data suggests that individuals prefer “opt-in” methods of obtaining consent to 
“opt-out” methods. Hoofnagle, supra note 92, at text accompanying nn.9-14, 48. 
 178. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 15. 
 179. The reactionary method by which Congress adopts privacy law has resulted in giving 
some interests strong privacy protection, while giving other similar interests weaker laws. Id. 
For example, strong privacy laws protect video store records as a response to Congressional 
disapproval over the release of Judge Robert Bork’s video rental information during his bid for 
Supreme Court confirmation. Id. Yet, far weaker privacy laws protect other kinds of personal 
information, such as medical records or financial data. Id. The result is an inadequate patchwork 
set of privacy laws with far too many holes. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See supra note 134 (discussing the rapid passage of the USA PATRIOT Act). 
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from the methods of search and surveillance, and instead to move 
towards the information itself.182 As technology becomes more 
sophisticated, the questions of “how” and “where” the search is 
conducted should give way to the crucial question of “what” 
underlying information was gathered as a result of the search.183 
Whether an individual is in the public eye should not be given as 
much weight as it is currently given where advanced technology is 
concerned. The casual observer of a public event cannot come close 
to ascertaining the amount of data and analysis that a computer can. 
Each individual piece of new technology that threatens privacy is 
ultimately a component of a “Surveillance Monster” that can reach 
every facet of daily life.184  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Whether in the law of torts, federal privacy law, or the judiciary’s 
Fourth Amendment analysis, current privacy law does not adequately 
protect the kind of privacy concerns raised by the personal tracking 
device. There must be significant safeguards to protect the personal, 
marketable data that a personal tracking device generates from 
circulation to interested third parties. 
The personal tracking device creates a new realm of potential for 
government surveillance. Law enforcement could intercept an 
individual’s GPS data, or access past information, making the 
individual constantly vulnerable to surveillance. Law enforcement’s 
ability to do so is becoming more pervasive as recent legislation, such 
as the USA PATRIOT Act, loosens restrictions to accessing data 
when conducting an investigation.  
 
 182. Simmons, supra note 168, at 1321-24. By focusing on the method of surveillance, 
courts engage in the needlessly complex inquiry of drawing analogies, asking questions such as: 
“[I]s thermal imaging analogous to watching snow melt off a roof or is it more like using 
binoculars? Or perhaps it is most analogous to using a dog to detect the odor of illegal 
contraband?” Id. at 1332 (internal citations omitted). 
 183. Id. at 1324-27. Simmons poses the question, “[W]hen the government observes our 
backyard, do we really care if they are doing it undetectably and legally from a satellite miles in 
the air or blatantly and illegally from a helicopter hovering ten feet above us?” Id. at 1324. By 
overemphasizing the method of surveillance, courts set a dangerous precedent that surveillance 
is okay if it does not feel intrusive. Id. at 1327.  
 184. Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 2, 14. 
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The most important step to protecting privacy is to increase public 
awareness of these issues. While personal tracking devices offer 
safety benefits, consumers should be aware of the significant privacy 
issues that these devices present. Further, the public must be aware of 
the bigger picture behind each new technology and each looser 
surveillance regulation: each bit of information can be collected and 
combined to form a comprehensive profile.185 If the public allows a 
new intrusion on privacy without hesitation, then ultimately this will 
become accepted as a normal part of life.186  
When the defendant in United States v. Knotts cautioned the Court 
against allowing twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen, the 
Court replied that when that day comes, there will be enough time for 
the courts to reevaluate the relevant constitutional principles.187 The 
Knotts Court misjudged the abundance of time available to reevaluate 
its Fourth Amendment analysis, as technology is developing at an 
increasingly rapid pace. It is urgent for the courts and the public to 
reevaluate privacy rights and related consumer expectations.  
 
 185. Id. at 2. Stanley and Steinhardt write: 
[U]nless each new development is also understood as just one piece of the larger 
surveillance mosaic that is rapidly being constructed around us, Americans are not 
likely to get excited about a given incremental loss of privacy like the tracking of cars 
through toll booths or the growing practice of tracking consumers’ supermarket 
purchases.  
 We are being confronted with fundamental choices about what sort of society we 
want to live in. But unless the terms of the debate are changed to focus on the forest 
instead of the trees, too many Americans will never even recognize the choice we face, 
and a decision against preserving privacy will be made by default. 
Id. at 14-15. 
 186. Id.  
 187. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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